/ 


1, 


m 


tit  V ty-r 


\4  O-hM^V.  •'  Vi  :\K'  *'  ■ 

•-  \  rah  i,?Ti',i^.':*k'1 


a® 


jm*.i  i  *  w 

i 

1 

tC  ■'...  '-A  | 

-, 

•  "  l 


Ai*’ 


m£& 


...  P 

; 

1 


.■  ■■*?•■:  4 i  n 


f-T«?r  ■-.  t 


W)’’! 


•Si 


BY 


OSCAR  S.  STRAUS 


Former  Ambassador  and  member  of  the 
Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration 
at  the  Hague 


Publication  No.  018 

Reprinted  from  A meriCa 'h  I nterehth  ah  Affbctkh  nv  the  European  War 
Vol.  LX  of  Tuf.  Annals  of  the 
American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science 
Philadelphia,  July,  1015 


■  f?  V  8®? 


■f  *A .  fa Ki*  »•**  *Ci  •*> 

-  4v*aaPS*3&2 


AMERICA’S  POSSIBLE  CONTRIBUTION 
TO  THE  WORLD’S  PEACE 


’>a 


V ' 


Fi 


V  . 


jl  Lif|i|bn|  rl 

' 


iMm 

Li “  e‘  i- 


4* 


HHH 


joeruWiw 

"M  ‘asnoei^S 


-W 

CO 


o 

oJ 


J 

t  / 

'ieprinted  from  The  Annals  of  the  American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social 
Science,  Philadelphia,  July,  1915. 

Publication  No.  918. 


AMERICA’S  POSSIBLE  CONTRIBUTION  TO  THE 
WORLD’S  PEACE 

By  Oscar  S.  Straus, 

Former  Ambassador  and  member  of  the  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration  at  the 

Hague. 


Any  discussion  of  America’s  possible  contribution  to  the  world’s 
peace  must  at  this  time,  in  the  nature  of  things,  be  purely  speculative 
and  hypothetical.  Whether  this  war  will  end  by  the  decided  vic¬ 
tory  of  the  one  side  or  the  other,  or  whether  it  will  be  prolonged  to  a 
state  of  exhaustion,  or  whether,  before  such  a  state  is  reached  and  in 
recognition  of  the  probability  that  such  will  be  the  result,  the  war¬ 
ring  nations  may  come  together  by  their  representatives  in  con¬ 
ference  to  arrange  for  the  conclusion  of  the'  war  and  for  plans  to 
secure  by  negotiation  what  they  may  have  failed  to  secure  at  the 
cannon’s  mouth — these  are  questions  surrounded  with  so  much 
uncertainty  at  the  present  time  that  no  one  is  justified  in  forming  a 
definite  conclusion. 

President  Wilson  and  his  administration,  animated  by  the  high 
and  noble  desire  to  conserve  the  moral  influence  of  our  country  as  a 
mediator  and  peace-maker,  have  made  and  are  making  every  effort 
to  maintain  not  only  a  strict  attitude  of  neutrality,  but  also  a  spirit 
of  impartiality  on  the  part  of  our  people.  To  quote  the  President’s 
words  from  his  recent  address  to  the  members  of  the  Associated 
Press: 

~~s> 

r  Let  us  think  of  America  before  we  think  of  Europe,  in  order  that  America 
may  be  fit  to  be  Europe’s  friend  when  the  day  of  tested  friendship  comes.  The 
.  test  of  friendship  is  not  now  sympathy  with  the  one  side  or  the  other,  but 
-  getting  ready  to  help  both  sides  when  the  struggle  is  over. 


And  yet  with  all  this  effort  on  the  part  of  our  government, 
p^which  has  been  consistently  urged  by  the  President  and  followed 
since  the  beginning  of  the  war  and  sometimes  in  the  face  of  severe 
provocation,  our  government’s  attitude  has  been  misinterpreted,  as 
is  evidenced  by  the  press  not  only  in  Germany  but  likewise  in  Great 
P  Britain  and  in  the  other  belligerent  countries.  This  misinterpreta¬ 
tion,  fault-finding  and  even  reproof  have  been  officially  expressed  in  a 

1 


31751 5 


2 


The  Annals  of  the  American  Academy 


statement  authoritatively  given  out  a  short  time  ago  by  the  German 
ambassador,  protesting  against  our  not  observing  our  neutral  obli¬ 
gations.  Utterances  in  some  of  the  leading  British  papers  would 
indicate  that  our  attitude  of  neutrality  likewise  does  not  satisfy 
public  opinion  in  that  country. 

I  refer  to  these  facts  because  the  attitude  and  the  disposition 
toward  us  of  the  belligerent  nations  will  have  a  direct  bearing  upon 
what  contribution  we  may  be  invited  or  permitted  to  make  in  aiding 
in  the  establishment  of  peace  among  the  warring  nations  and  in  the 
development  of  plans  for  securing  the  permanent  peace  of  the 
world. 

There  is  yet  another  important  consideration  which  we  shall 
have  to  determine  for  ourselves  before  it  will  be  possible  fdr  us  to 
have  a  part  or  take  a  part  in  devising  plans  for  the  peace  of  the 
world.  The  American  traditional  policy  has  been  expressed  in  two 
important  state  papers,  in  Washington’s  farewell  address,  and  in 
President  Monroe’s  message  to  Congress,  which  state  papers  have  a 
prestige  and  authority  second  only  to  the  Declaration  of  Indepen¬ 
dence  and  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  Washington,  in 
his  farewell  address,  stated  that  Europe  had  “a  set  of  primary 
interests  which  to  us  have  none  or  very  remote  relations.  ”  His 
thought  was,  that  it  was  the  course  of  wisdom  so  far  as  possible  to 
disassociate  America  from  the  ordinary  vicissitudes  of  European 
politics. 

Monroe,  in  his  message,  amplified  the  Washington  policy  as  the 
changed  circumstances  and  the  immediate  necessities  demanded, 
by  reminding  the  powers  of  the  Holy  Alliance  of  our  policy  in  regard 
to  European  nations,  that  we  would  not  interfere  in  their  internal 
concern,  and  that  we  would  not  regard  their  interference  in  the 
affairs  of  the  government  of  the  states  on  the  American  continent 
with  indifference.  This  American  policy  in  its  double  form  was 
annexed  to  the  signatures  of  the  American  delegates  to  the  Hague 
convention,  and  was  spread  on  the  minutes  of  the  conference,  and 
as  such  recognized  by  the  nations  of  the  world. 

The  question,  therefore,  naturally  arises:  has  America  the 
right  to  demand  participation  in  the  conferences  of  the  belligerent 
nations  following  the  present  war,  for  the  purposes  of  arranging  for 
the  future  peace  of  the  world?  Another  question  presents  itself: 
even  if  we  should  not  have  the  right,  and  in  the  event  that  we  should 


America  and  the  World’s  Peace 


3 


be  invited  by  the  belligerent  nations  as  the  leading  neutral  power  to 
participate  in  such  a  conference,  can  we  do  so  without  impliedly,  if 
not  expressly,  relinquishing  our  traditional  attitude  of  exclusive 
control  over  purely  American  questions? 

This  contingency  will  bring  to  the  foreground  the  consideration, 
if  not  the  wisdom,  of  a  further  extension  if  not  a  reversing  of  the 
American  traditional  policy  as  outlined  by  Washington  when  he 
said  : 

The  great  rule  of  conduct  for  us  in  regard  to  foreign  nations  is  in  extend¬ 
ing  our  commercial  relations  to  have  with  them  as  little  political  connection  as 
possible.  So  far  as  we  have  already  formed  engagements,  let  them  be  fulfilled 
with  perfect  good  faith.  Here  let  us  stop. 

The  question  that  would  present  itself,  have  not  the  world 
relations  and  the  interdependent  interests  of  nations  since  Wash¬ 
ington’s  admonition  was  given,  become  so  closely  and  intimately 
related  so  that  our  duty  to  other  nations  as  well  as  our  own  “en¬ 
lightened  self-interests”  make  it  imperative  upon  us  not  to  “stop,” 
but  to  unite  with  the  nations  of  the  world  in  such  a  policy,  be  it  by 
international  agreement,  by  entering  into  a  league  with  the  leading 
nations  of  the  world,  or  by  becoming  a  member  of  a  world  federa¬ 
tion,  or  by  uniting  in  such  a  joint  arrangement,  as  in  the  wisdom  of 
nations  may  be  determined  upon  as  the  most  practical  and  effective 
for  the  establishment  and  maintenance  of  the  peace  of  the  world? 

From  generation  to  generation  we  have  been  making  radical 
changes  in  our  internal  policies,  and  notably  in  the  direction  of  the 
enlargement  of  the  powers  of  the  central  government.  The  Inter¬ 
state  Commerce  Laws  and  the  Federal  Reserve  Act  are  themselves 
distinct  evidences  of  those  changes.  A  nation  cannot  remain  sta¬ 
tionary  any  more  in  its  national  than  in  its  international  relation¬ 
ship  and  policy.  “New  occasions  teach  new  duties.” 

It  is  not  improbable  that  the  outgrowth  of  this  war  will  affect 
the  future  policies  not  only  of  the  belligerent  nations  but  of  neutral 
nations  as  well.  Norman  Angell  says  that  if  we  do  not  mix  in 
European  affairs,  Europe  will  mix  in  our  affairs,  and  that  the  day 
of  isolation  for  us,  whether  we  like  it  or  not,  is  over.  He  may  be 
right.  It  is  much  easier  for  a  country  when  it  is  small  in  population 
and  in  interests  to  remain  aloof,  than  when  it  becomes  one  of  the 
great  powers  of  the  world.  Our  country  with  its  population  of  a 
hundred  million  and  its  expanded  world  commerce  is  too  large  a 


4 


The  Annals  of  the  American  Academy 


factor  to  stand  aloof  from  world  questions.  In  the  event  of  a 
league  or  confederation  of  the  leading  nations,  for  us  to  separate 
ourselves  by  refusing  to  assume  our  share  of  responsibility  mignt 
conflict  with  our  national  interests  and  our  international  duties  and 
have  the  result  of  placing  ourselves  in  opposition  to  the  world 
policies  of  the  new  world-state.  In  such  an  event,  would  it  not  be 
better  for  such  a  world-state  as  well  as  for  ourselves  to  form  a 
part  of  such  a  state  and  help  to  shape  its  policies  as  one  of  the  im¬ 
portant  constituent  members,  than  to  conserve  our  traditional  pol¬ 
icies  and  stand  aloof? 

These  are  questions  that  not  unlikely,  I  might  say,  very  prob¬ 
ably,  will  present  themselves  to  the  American  government  at  the 
outcome  of  the  present  war  or  even  before,  in  contributing  its 
mediatory  offices  in  bringing  the  war  to  a  conclusion. 

Our  country  has  as  deep  a  concern,  not  only  morally,  but 
economically  and  industrially,  in  the  peace  of  the  world  as  any  one 
of  the  larger  nations.  A  war  such  as  this,  or  upon  such  a  consider¬ 
able  scale,  affects  under  the  changed  economic  and  commercial 
conditions  and  relationships  of  modern  times  the  neutral  nations 
only  to  a  lesser  degree  than  the  nations  actually  at  war.  And, 
therefore,  have  we  not  the  right  and  is  it  not  our  duty  to  cooperate 
to  the  fullest  of  our  power  in  the  perfection  and  the  maintenance  of 
a  plan  for  the  preservation  of  peace? 

It  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  extreme  suffering  and  sacrifice  that 
this  war  entails  may  have  the  compensation  of  developing  supreme 
wisdom  on  the  part  of  the  nations.  The  nations  of  the  world,  to 
be  at  peace,  must  develop  a  broader  patriotism  as  distinguished 
frQm  a  national  jingoism,  a  more 'enlightened  sense  of  justice  which 
does  not  preach  one  gospel  on  one  side  of  a  national  border  and  a 
different  or  opposite  gospel  on  the  other  side.  In  other  words,  so 
long  as  the  standards  of  national  justice  and  international  justice 
are  not  in  consonance  but  on  different  levels,  and  in  many  respects 
directly  opposed  to  one  another,  the  security  for  peace  must  largely 
depend  upon  the  doctrine  of  might.  Until  the  international  con¬ 
science  is  brought  under  the  majesty  of  the  law,  there  can  be  no 
permanent  security  for  international  peace. 

Perhaps  the  most  guiding  and  impressive  contribution  that 
America  can  make  to  the  world’s  peace  is  the  successful  experiment 
and  example  of  its  federated  union  of  forty-eight  separate  common- 


America  and  the  World’s  Peace  5 

wealths,  which  affords  to  the  world  a  striking  illustration  that  its 
preservation  is  due  to  the  fact  that  behind  the  right  of  each  one  of 
these  commonwealths,  the  smallest  as  well  as  the  largest,  stands  the 
united  might  of  all.  This  greatest  of  all  wars,  involving  directly 
nearly  two-thirds  of  the  population  of  the  world,  is  a  glaring  and 
ghastly  evidence  that  international  relationship  has  to  be  recon¬ 
structed,  that  the  plans  heretofore  devised,  of  nations  standing 
alone  or  separating  themselves  into  two  or  three  great  divisions 
under  dual  or  triple  alliances  and  ententes,  have  lamentably  broken 
down,  and  instead  of  lessening  the  area  and  the  horrors  of  war,  have 
had  the  opposite  result  and  drawn  nations  into  war  that  otherwise 
would  have  remained  at  peace. 

Therefore,  the  federation  or  league  of  all  the  states  in  the  Amer¬ 
ican  union  embodies  the  ideal,  if  not  the  plan,  for  a  universal  league 
or  federation  of  the  nations  as  the  surest  and  safest  guarantee  for 
securing  the  permanent  peace  of  the  world.  In  such  a  federation 
power  will  be  needed,  not  for  aggression  but  to  prevent  aggression. 
Power  will  be  needed,  not  to  promote  the  selfish  ends  of  individual 
nations  but  to  curb  them.  Power  will  be  needed,  not  for  making 
war  but  for  repressing  war,  for  maintaining  peace.  Power  will  be 
needed,  not  for  breaking  treaties  but  for  maintaining  them;  and 
this  power  must  not  be  vested  in  one,  but  in  all  the  nations. 


\ 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2018  with  funding  from 

University  of  Illinois  Urbana-Champaign  Alternates 


https://archive.org/details/americaspossibleOOstra 


